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Abstract. I explore a unique exogenous instrument to examine how the intra-familial 
position of women influence health outcomes of their children using micro data from 
Ghana. Using the 2SLS-IV estimation technique, I build a model of household bargaining 
and child health development with perceptions of women regarding wife-beating and 
marital rape in the existence of domestic violence laws, in Ghana. Even though the initial 
OLS estimates suggest that women‘s participation in decisions regarding purchases of 
household consumption goods help to improve child health outcomes, the IV estimates 
reveal that the presence of endogeneity underestimates the impact of women‘s bargaining 
power on child health outcomes. Our choice of instrument is robust to endogeneity, father 
characteristics and residency robustness checks. 
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1. Introduction 
others play a critical role in fostering early childhood development, 
strongly influencing children‘s long-term intellectual and physical health 
(Smith & Haddad, 2000). However, despite progress in the last few 
decades, women continue to be disadvantaged in economic as well as familial 
spheres in many societies, with obstacles ranging from discrimination in the labor 
market, access to credit, to inheritance and ownership rights in the family (World 
Bank, 2011).  
The recognition that the unequal distribution of intra-household power may 
have heterogeneous implications for parental investments in children has ignited a 
growing interest in intra-household resource allocation and its implication for 
developmental outcomes of children. This project revolves around intra-familial 
position of women in Ghana and its implication for early childhood development 
regarding health.  
A survey of the literature, however, reveals a lack of consensus on the measures 
of bargaining power. In the literature, bargaining power within households has 
been measured using direct and indirect proxies like relative income contribution, 
educational attainment, and direction of dowry, inheritance and ownership rights 
(e.g. Blumberg, 1988; Anderson & Eswaran, 2009; Friedemann-Sanchez, 2006).  
The differences in the measures of women‘s bargaining power may be attributed 
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tothe diversity in the political and social institutions and norms across countries 
and cultures.  
It is therefore important from a policy point of view to understand the effect of 
women‘s bargaining power on early childhood development in each country 
through the lens of the norms and institutions that are peculiar to the culture of that 
country. 
In this project, I argue that the effect of women‘s bargaining power on 
childhealth in Ghana is mediated through domestic violence laws, which protect 
women frommarital rape and wife beating. The choice of domestic violence laws 
as an instrument for bargaining power will enable me to address any endogeneity 
associated with the direct measure of bargaining power. In the literature, when 
child development outcomes are regressed on direct measures such as women‘s 
degree of control over household decisions, they tend to yield biased and 
inconsistent Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates due to the endogeneity of the 
main regressor (Bernal & Keane, 2010).  
Endogeneity may arisebecause in many societies, women with high quality 
(healthy and well-educated) children tend to gain more respect in the family and 
community, hencemore bargaining power. In this case, the reverse causality 
becomes a threat to consistency. Endogeneity may also arise because in the 
Ghanaiansociety there is a traditionalpredilection for male children. As a result, 
women with male children tend to have a lot of respect within the family, obtain 
more bargaining power and may be able to invest more in their children (especially 
when they are all males). 
To deal with the endogeneity, the 2-Stage Least Squares –Instrumental Variable 
(2SLS-IV) estimation technique is employed. I make use of the existence of 
domestic violence laws (which is captured as women‘s attitude towards wife-
beating for refusing to have sex with the husband)as an exogenous instrument for 
women‘s bargaining power. This instrument is exogenous because in jurisdictions 
like Ghana withjudicial systems that protect women‘s rights, strong incentives 
exists for women to exercise their rights and participate more actively at all levels 
of decision making. These laws therefore confer bargaining power on women 
independent of the child.  
The Domestic Violence (DV) Law, which has been in enforcement since 2007 
contains provisions that criminalize various acts of violence – physical, economic 
and psychological abuse, intimidation, and harassment (Manuh, 2007). Therefore, 
there is an indication of low self-esteem or non-empowerment if a woman (even 
after the passage of this law)believes that a husband is justified in beating his wife 
for refusing sex. Such a perception could act as a barrier for women in accessing 
effective health care for themselves and their children (Ghana Demographic and 
Health Survey, 2008). 
To understand thiswhole interaction within a structure, this paper develops a 
model of household bargaining with women‘s attitude towardswife beating and 
marital rape and its implication for child health outcomes. The implications of the 
model is tested using the 2008 Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (hence 
GDHS) data.  The choice of Ghana is important because it allows me to explore the 
existence of domestic violence laws as unique instrumental variable for the first 
time in the literature. 
Italsohelps to provide robust empirical supportfor designing policy measures 
targeted at bridging gender gaps to affect child development outcomes in Ghana 
where women lack influence in household decision-making, mainly because of 
strong patriarchal family structures, even though, they constitute more than 50% of 
the population (Baden et al, 1994) 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 3(1), A.S. Nuhu, p.126-138. 
128 
This is the first paper to explore domestic violence asan instrumental variable 
for women‘s bargaining power whilsttesting its implications for child health 
outcomes using a unique micro data set. 
I have two objectives. First to identify an exogenous instrument for women‘s 
bargaining power and to construct a model with this exogenous instrument to 
examine the effect of this power on child health outcomes using micro-level data 
from Ghana. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Theoretical Literature  
Several useful models on intra-household resource allocation and bargaining 
have emerged after a substantial body of literature on household bargaining 
questioned the validity of the traditional unitary household model. The unitary 
model, which treated household as a single unit with common preferences, utility, 
decisions and choices, has been unable to withstand a number of empirical 
verifications (e.g. Schultz, 1990; Thomas, 1990). 
As a result, there is a growing consensus in the literature that the household 
behavior cannot be modelled as though members of the household had a set of 
stable preferences. However, though there exist several useful alternatives, there is 
no agreement on the best way to model household behavior. Indeed, the literature 
recognizes that models on household bargaining may differ to reflect the social, 
economic and cultural contexts in which they are used (Chiappori et al, 2006). In 
this section, I provide a brief overview of some of the existing models proposed to 
replace the unitary model. 
The collective model developed Chiappori, (1988) and restructured by 
Chiappori et al (2006) recognizes individual preferences within a household and 
enables individual bargaining power to influence household choices and outcomes. 
The model assumes that regardless of how decisions are made, outcomes made 
under these assumptions are always Pareto efficient. The implications of this model 
have been upheld by several empirical studies (e.g. Vermeulen, 2000) 
The non-cooperative model assumes that resources earned by individuals are 
expended according to individual preferences and interests (Ulph, 1988). There 
exists no pooling of resources as it happens in the unitary or cooperative models. 
There is however, mixed opinions in the literatureon whether outcomes made under 
the assumptions of this model are pareto-efficient (Bourguignon et al., 1993; Udry, 
1996). 
The cooperative bargaining model, also like the collective model, assumes that 
household bargaining outcomes are Pareto-efficient. It however establishes more 
firmly, the process by which the pareto-efficient outcomes are attained, by 
assuming the presence of a threat point for each household member (Elroy & 
Horney, 1981; Manser & Brown, 1980). The threat point is usually an external 
utility option to members of the household. An example of this outcome is 
―divorce‖, where the threat point for the household is dissolving the marriage. The 
efficiency of divorce as a threat point for intra-household bargaining however 
remains largely debatable (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). Per the data used in this 
paper, household decisions are made under of the assumptions of the cooperative 
bargaining model where resources are pooled and decisions made reflect individual 
preferences. The threat point for making pareto-efficient decisions lies in the ability 
of any ‗abused‘ member of the household to exploit or use domestic violence laws 
to seek redress. 
2.2. Empirical Literature 
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A number of studies suggest that women‘s participation in economic activities 
is a sustainable way to help build human capital in developing countries. This 
section surveys the results of extant studies, on the subject of intra-household 
bargaining and child development outcomes. 
Using women‘s ethnicity, ―arguably‖, as an instrument for bargaining power, 
Lepine & Strobl (2013) found that women with bargaining power tend to have 
children with better nutritional status in rural Senegal. Whilst Ueyama (2006), with 
household survey data from rural Malawi, found that women‘s participation in 
agriculture has a positive effect on child health, through the added ‗income effect‘ 
and ‗food effect‘. Afridi  et al (2012) also studying the impact of India‘s National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on children‘s educational 
outcomes via women‘s labour force participation, found that greater participation 
of mothers in the program was associated with better educational outcomes of their 
children.  
Similarly, Smith (2003) also using DHS household surveys for 36 South Asian, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean countries, found a strong 
association between the index of women‘s decision-making power and her child‘s 
nutrition. 
 On his part, Kishor (2000) used data from the Egypt‘s 1995 DHS and 
employed multivariate analyses to explore the correlations between women‘s 
empowerment and child health. The study found that a woman‘s lifetime exposure 
to employment is significantly correlated with both child survival and health. 
Furthermore, studies such as Haddad et al. (1997), Thomas (1997), Quisumbing 
& Maluccio (2000), Doss (2001), Duflo & Udry (2004) and Fantahun et al, (2007) 
also found a positive relationship between women‘s empowerment and 
eitherchilddevelopmentoutcomes.  
Even thoughcultural norms and political institutions strongly influence child 
outcomes by either constraining or improving women‘s bargaining positions, there 
exists major gaps, in the literature, in spelling out the dynamics of these processes 
(Agarwal, 1997). This is because, majority of the literature has tended to focus on 
more direct and observable measures such as incomes, education, participation in a 
microfinance program or agriculture etc.  For example, in view of the societal 
preference for male children in China, women with first-born sons have been found 
to have greater bargaining power than women with first-born daughters (Li & Wu, 
2011). 
This paper thus seeks to fill this gap by investigating how the existence of 
institutions that protect women from domestic violence influence women‘s 
bargaining positions and subsequently how this translates into child development 
outcomes. The implications of this model, I believe can be replicated in other 
societies with little regard to the cultural or economic setting of the society. 
Like many developing societies with strong patriarchal family structures, 
marriage in Ghana is associated high social esteem.  For many societies, though the 
certificate of marriage confers certain rights and powers on the partners involved, 
the degree of control over decision making within the marriage is unequally shared 
between partners. 
This is because the customary institution, which represents the primary source 
of legitimacy for most marriages in Ghana, does not view women and men as equal 
partners in marriage. Generally, the woman is expected to be subservient and 
obedient to the husband, and the husband is expected to exercise maximum control 
to keep the house in order. Dery & Diedong (2014), observes that a prime example 
of this is the traditional right of men to discipline their wives through beating. 
However, this beating should be reasonable, such that it does not cause awful 
physical injuries or death. Given this cultural foundation, it is not surprising that 
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domestic violence was seen as a normal practice and a means of maintaining order 
in the household. 
To control domestic violence, the government of Ghana in February 2007 
passed the Domestic Violence (DV) Act 732 which mandates the Domestic 
Violence and Victims Support Unit (hence DOVVSU) to fight domestic violence 
in all its forms and to set up a victim support fund to advance that cause (GDHS, 
2008).The passage of the DV Act has since criminalized most acts of violence 
against women and children, and has fundamentally changed the perception of 
Ghanaian women on domestic violence, including, making it criminal for husband 
to use force their wives into having sex without consent. This has provided a 
fundamental pathway to empower women by granting women in the household, the 
right to make choices and decisions that best represent their individual interests 
without fear of abuse from their partners.  
Evidence from the literature confirms this assertion. For example, Dery & 
Diedong (2014) using survey data from the Upper West Region of Ghana found 
that proximity of a household to the police or the DOVVSU is negatively related to 
the occurrence of violence within that household and that physical violence has 
been on a decrease since the passage of the law. 
On the back of this information, the paper explores domestic violence laws as 
an exogenous instrument, which confers bargaining power on women independent 
of child outcomes. This helps deal sufficiently with any potential endogeneity of 
the main regressor. 
 
3. Research Design 
The study is based on micro level data on Ghana from the 2008 Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey administered by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The survey, which is based on a nationally 
representative household sample, provides data for 11,778 households. The survey 
employed two-stage sample design. The first stage involved selecting 412 sample 
points from an updated master sampling frame constructed for the 2000 Ghana 
Population and Housing Census, using systematic sampling with probability 
proportional to size. The second stage involved systematic sampling of 30 of the 
households listed in each cluster. 
On the data collection, three separate questionnaires were used to collect 
information from the selected sample, namely, the Household Questionnaire, the 
Women‘s Questionnaire and the Men‘s Questionnaire. This paper uses data from 
the Women‘s Questionnaire, whichwas used to collect information from all women 
age 15-49 in half of theselected households. These women were asked questions 
about themselves and their children born between 2003 and 2008, on topics 
including but not limited to education, media exposure, wealth, vaccinations and 
childhood illnesses, marriage, occupation and husband‘s background 
characteristics, childhood mortality and domestic violence. For the purpose of this 
research, I give a brief overview of the key variables of interest as presented in the 
DHS survey in the following section: 
To capture the empowerment effect of gender equity, the survey collects data on 
women‘s attitude towards wife-beating and other forms of violence asa proxy for 
women‘s status in the household. Respondents were asked whether a husband is 
justified in beating his wife under a series of circumstances: when wife burns the 
food, whenwife argues with him, when wife goes out without telling him, when 
wife neglects the children, and when wife refuses to have sex with him. Per the 
structure of the survey, responses that suggest a justification of wife beating by 
husbands is seen as a reflection of the woman‘s low status and empowerment 
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within the household. Such views show the acceptance of cultural norms that give 
men the right to use force against women (GDHS, 2008). 
In addition to measures that sought to capture women‘s view on domestic 
violence, the survey collected data on direct measures of women‘s empowerment. 
Respondents were asked about who makes the final decisions on the following 
issues: respondent‘s own health care, making large household purchases, making 
household purchases for daily needs, and visiting her family or relatives. Having a 
final say in the decision-making process is the highest degree of autonomy. 
Women are considered to participate in a decision-making if they usually make that 
decision alone or jointly with their husband. Such information provides insight into 
women‘s control over their environment and their attitudes towards gender roles, 
both of which are relevant to understanding women‘s ability to make independent 
decisions about their own health care and that of their children (GDHS, 2008). 
The nutritional status of young children provides a useful gauge for assessing 
their future health and development prospects. However, manyunder-five children 
in developing countries are often exposed to the risks of childhood illnesses and 
nutritional deficiencies, whichsignificantly affect theirlong-term health 
development (GDHS, 2008). This paper uses the Body Mass Index (BMI) of 
children as a measure of their health status. The BMI, which is measured as weight 
adjusted for height, is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by the square of 
height in meters. The BMI is important because it reflects both current and past 
nutritional investment in children (GDHS, 2008). Again,the World Health 
Organization (2006) notes that differences in children's weight and height growth, 
from birth to age five are more influenced by nutrition and healthcare than genetics 
or ethnicity.Even though genetic factors matter for child height, Martorell and 
Habicht (1986) explain that they only become more critical in adolescent years. 
The GDHS data captures the BMI as a Z-score. The BMIZ-scorecan be 
understoodas the number of standard deviations of child‘s BMI, fromthe average 
BMI of her reference group. The World Health Organization uses the Multi-Centre 
Growth Reference, which comprises more than 8,000 children from Brazil, Ghana 
is, India, Norway, Oman and the USA, selected because they grew up in an 
environment that is deemed optimal for a child‘s growth(WHO, 2006). In this data, 
the Z-score is mathematically given as, 
 
Z-score=
 Xij      −     µij
σij
, 
 
Where Xij represents the observed height-adjusted weight (BMI) of child of age 
i and gender j whilst the Uij and σijrepresents the mean and the standard deviations 
of the reference group with age i and of gender group j. Based on the classifications 
of the World Health Organization (2006), a child whose BMI is below -2 standard 
deviations of the reference group‘s average BMI is considered too thin or 
underweight for her age and gender while a child is said to be overweight if herif 
her BMI exceeds +2 standard deviations of the reference group‘s average BMI. In 
this paper, we expect mother‘s bargaining power to be positively associated with a 
child‘s BMI or health outcome. 
 
4. Estimation Technique and Methodology 
This paper uses the 2-Stage-Least-Square Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) 
estimation approach.  Per this technique, I build three different models at different 
stages of the estimation process. The first model, which is the most parsimonious 
model, uses to estimate the relationship between Child‘s BMI Z-score captured as 
HealthStatusij of child i in household j, and the mother‘s degree of say, in making 
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decisions on the daily needs for the home, which is captured as MumPowerij.  This 
is represented mathematically as: 
 
HealthStatusij=α0 + α1MumPower ij + α2FamilyWealth ij + MumEduc ij+εij. 
 
Based on the data, I create a dichotomous variable for the main regressor. That 
is, ins measuring women‘s bargaining power, a woman who either takes household 
daily purchases decision alone or jointly with the husband is given a value of 1 
whilst women who have no say at all in making purchases for household daily 
needs is given a value of 0. Whilst women who makes decisions alone possess 
absolute power on making daily household consumption goods decision, the data 
does not state specifically what degree or proportion of power is exercised by 
women when they make decisions jointly with the husband. For the purpose of this 
paper, we assume that in making joint decisions, women best represent their 
interests and that of their children. 
I expect α1 > 0 so that women‘s bargaining power is positively related to a 
child‘s BMI Z-score. α2 represents the wealth index of the family. It is a dummy 
variable with a value of 1 if the household is poor whilst α3 captures whether the 
woman has ever received formal education greater than or equal to primary school 
and the stochastic term εij, represents the collective impact of unobserved factors on 
the child‘s BMI Z-score. 
The second model, which represents the first stage of the 2SLS-IV 
estimation,uses the logistic regression to estimate the probability that a woman will 
have bargaining power, given her attitude to wife beating. Here, a woman who 
think wife beating is justified assumes a value of 0 whilst a woman who think it is 
not justified assumes a value of 1. 
 
Logit (MumPowerij)=ﻻ0 + ﻻ1Dviolenceij ++ ﻻ2MumEduc ij+ ﻻ3MumEmplo ij+ εij. 
 
Guided by the literature I expect ﻻ1 >0, that is women who reject domestic 
violence should be associated with bargaining power. ﻻ2 andﻻ3  controls for the 
impact of the woman‘s education and participation in economic activity in 
determining her bargaining power whilst the error term, εij , captures the effects of 
unobserved factors on women‘s bargaining power.If the hypothesis holds, in the 
second stage of estimation, I replace MumPower with the predicted value of 
MumPower in the second stage of the regression model. This yields the following 
model: 
 
HealthStatusij=α0 + α1PredictedMumPowerij, + α3xij + α4xij+ α5xij+ εij. 
 
My a priori expectation is that α1>0, and is different from the α1in the model 
which means that women with bargaining power have children who are likely to 
have more weight than their reference group. In the third model, I include a set of 
controls, as robustness check, primarily, motherseducational and health 
characteristics, participation in economic activity, access to mass media, household 
income, demographic and father characteristics, which may affect child health 
through unobserved channels.  The controls are briefly outlined in the ensuing 
section. 
Mother’s Education 
The literature is well replete with evidence on the positive associations between 
child development and maternal education. Education offers an important channel 
for empowering women with the knowledge, skills and self-confidence necessary 
to participate fully in the development process (Promoting Gender Equality, 2013). 
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Educated women are able to make informed decisions on their health and that of 
their household members. Given the pivotal role maternal education or the lack 
thereof, plays in child health development, this paper includes a measure that 
captures whether the mother in question has ever received any form of education. 
This dummy is constructed from the data by assigning 0 women who had no 
education and 1 to those who have obtained either primary, secondary or tertiary 
education. The model does not include measures that captures the individual effects 
of the different levels or stages of education on child health outcomes. Again, there 
is a possibility that the impact of maternal education is underestimated because 
educated mothers tend to have more surviving children and thus the sampling of 
living children may result in an over-representation of children of educated 
mothers (Desai & Alva 1998).  However, since educated women tend to be 
associated with lower fertility rates than uneducated mothers, I hope that, at best, 
the two effects compensate each other. 
4.1. Household Wealth Index 
The model also controls for the general effect of the household income level on 
the probability that the child is anemic. This is done by including the wealth index 
variable, which is a composite measure of a household's cumulative living 
standard, calculated by using easy-to-collect data on a household‘s ownership of 
selected assets, access to water and sanitation facilities. This index is important 
because it allows me to tease out the relative impact of household income on child 
health. In the GDHS data, based on the composite score, households are classified 
under 1 of 5 categories in an ascending scale of income namely, poorest, poorer, 
middle, richer and richest. Based on this, I create a dummy to capture poverty, 
which assumes a value of 1 if household is poorer or poorest and 0 if household is 
not 
4.2. Father’s Educational Characteristics 
Father‘s educational characteristics caninfluence child‘s health through multiple 
channels. Educated men are less likely to subject their wives to domestic violence 
and hence lead to greater empowerment of women, which in turn, translates, into 
better child outcomes. Again, educated fathers are on average healthier and are 
more likely to produce and raise healthy children. For instance, Thomas (1994) 
finds a positive association between child health and higher father‘s educational 
attainment. By not controlling for father‘s education, the impact of mother‘s 
empowerment on child outcomes may be over-estimated. It is therefore important 
to tease out the relative impact of father‘s education by including a variable that 
captures this measure. In this paper, I control for father‘s educational 
characteristics by including two dummies that capture whether the woman‘s 
partner or husband has had any formal education.  
 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. OLS Estimates 
Table III presents the summary of empirical findings from both the initial OLS 
and the Instrumental Variable estimates. The results suggest that all the predictor 
variables apart from mother‘s age, participation in economic activity and 
household wealth are significant in explaining the variation in Child BMI. 
Specifically, the OLS estimation suggests that women who take part in making 
decisions regarding daily household purchases have children whose Body Mass 
Index are about 0.15 standard deviations (SD) greater than the average BMI of 
their reference group and this is significant at about 5%. The OLS estimates also 
show that a unit increase in a mother‘s own Body Mass Index (proxy for maternal 
health) is associated with an average of 0.04 standard deviations increase in her 
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child‘s BMI whilst increases in mother‘s years of education and child age also 
increase child BMI by about 0.19 and 0.09 standard deviations respectively. 
5.2. First Stage Logistic Estimation 
The first stage IV estimation results are summarized in Table II.  The results of 
the first stage estimation are consistent with our a priori expectations; women who 
do not believe that domestic violence is justified are likely to have the power to 
make decisions on daily household purchases, either alone or with the husband. 
The co-efficient of the domestic violence variable is 0.85, in the absence of 
controls and is highly significant below 1%. After controlling for woman‘s 
education and her participation in economic activity in the past one year, the co-
efficient of the domestic violence variable falls to 0.68 but still remains highly 
significant.  Again, our endogeneity concerns are shown to be consistent with the 
first stage estimation, which shows that women with female children tend to have 
lower bargaining power whilst women with healthy children (higher BMI Z-scores) 
tend to have more bargaining power. 
5.3. Second Stage Estimation 
After replacing mother‘s bargaining powerwith the predicted values of mother‘s 
bargaining power (which is domestic violence) from the first stage IV estimation, 
we find that child Body Mass Index increases by about 2.5 SDs for women who 
have bargaining power and remains highly significant. This is about 2.35 SDs 
higher than the co-efficient of the OLS estimation. In this first model of the second 
stage estimation, we still control for mother‘s characteristics of health (BMI), years 
of education, age, and participation in economic activity over the past 12 months. 
We also include child age and household poverty to control for the unobserved 
influences of these factors on child health. The results suggest that an increase in a 
mother‘s BMI is associated with about 0.05 standard deviations increase in child 
BMI. An additional year in a child‘s life also leads to about 0.09 SD increase in the 
child‘s BMI. These findings are all consistent with the literature. Mother‘s 
participation in economic activity is surprisingly found to be negatively related to 
child health outcome and is statistically significant. Whilst we cannot say much 
about causality, we assume that happens if women‘s participation in economic 
activity, keeps them away from children, to the extent that it becomes detrimental 
to child health. The results also suggest that an increase in a woman‘s age is 
negatively related to the health outcome of her child and it is statistically 
significant. Even though this result comes as a surprise, it could also reflect the fact 
that older women are less acquainted with the recent domestic violence laws, and 
are more in tune with the dictates of the norms and traditions, which limit their 
participation in household decision –making regarding their own health and that of 
their children. Poverty also surprisingly remains insignificant as a determinant of 
child health outcome in both OLS and second stage IV regressions. 
In the second IV model, we control for the unobserved influences of father‘s 
educational characteristics (uneducated father) and age as well the possible impact 
of rural residency on child health. The results, which are also summarized in Table 
III, suggest that father‘s age, educational attainment and rural residency have no 
significant impact on child health. However, the co-efficient of the previous 
variables change. This may suggest that, in the presence of an ageing uneducated 
father in a rural household, mother‘s bargaining power increases child BMI by 
some additional 0.6 standard deviation over the reference group, which is 
consistent with the literature. Under these controls, a mother‘s age and 
participation in economic activity remain significant and negatively related to her 
child health whilst child age continues to be positive and significant as well but 
with higher co-efficient. 
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5.4. Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
To test whether the suspected endogenous variable is indeed endogenous and 
whether our instrumental variable is exogenous, we employ the Hausman test for 
endogeneity.   To do this, we run a reduced form of the baseline regression with 
Mother‘s Power as dependent variable. This yields the model. 
 
MumPower= π0 + π1X1 ij+ π2X2ij+ π3X3ij+ π4X4ij+ π5X5ij+ π6X6ij+ π7X7ij+ ε 
 
Where X1 is the domestic violence dummy, X2 is woman‘s education in years, 
X3 is Woman‘s BMI, X5 is Child Age, X5is dummy for whether the woman is 
working,X6 is the woman‘s age in years, and X7is the household wealth dummy 
whilst ε is the error term. Since we suspect that the MumPower variable suffers 
endogeneity from unobserved reverse causation and omitted variable bias, we 
include the residuals from the reduced form equation in the structural form 
regression below,  
 
HealthStatus= Z0 + Z1X1 ij+ Z2X2ij+ Z3X3ij+Z4X4ij+Z5X5ij+Z6X6ij+ Z7X7ij+ Z8yi +µ, 
where Z1, Z2... Z7  are the explanatory variables in the baseline IV regression, while 
Z8is the residuals of the reduced form model.  The model is run on the 
nullhypothesis that theyi is statistically insignificant and Z8 = 0. If the null 
hypothesis holds, then MumPower is exogenous and does not need IV estimation. 
However, our Hausman test results, summarized in Table 3.0 of the Appendix 
section, shows that the reduced form residuals are statistically significant and thus 
we reject the null hypothesis that the mother power is exogenous. This also 
confirms that domestic violence dummy is a good instrument for the mother‘s 
bargaining power variable. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper set-off to investigate the impact of the women‘s bargaining power on 
child health outcomes. To achieve this, we build a model of intrahousehold 
bargaining with perceptions of women regarding domestic violence and marital 
rape, and its implications for child health outcomes using the 2-SLS Instrumental 
Variable technique in order to circumvent endogeneity resulting from omitted 
variable bias andunobserved reverse causality between the dependent variable and 
main regressor. Our Hausman test for endogeneity confirmed this as a good 
instrument and the IV estimates showed that impact of women‘s bargaining power 
on child health is underestimated by the biases in the OLS estimation. We also 
found consistent with the literature that the years of education obtained by a 
woman and her health status directly mattered for the health of her child. Whilst, 
father‘s illiteracy and rural residency and poverty in the household do not matter 
directly for child health, per our sample, we find that the impact of women‘s 
bargaining power on child health tend to increase in households where father has 
no education.  
This paper provides strong empirical evidence for women empowerment in 
order to drive investments in child health especially in countries where strong 
patriarchal family structures that prevent the effective participation of women in 
the household decision-making process. The paper shows that a simple, well-
carved legislation that protect women from domestic violence and abuse could 
tremendously improve women‘s bargaining positionsand allow them to 
independently, make decisions that are in the best interest of themselves and their 
children.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Results of OLS and IV Estimations 
Variable OLS Estimates 2SLS- Model 1  
Instrument = Domestic Violence  
2SLS-Model 2 
Mother‘s Power 0.148**       [0.076] 2.528***      [1.231] 3.080*     [1.177] 
Mother‘s BMI 0.037***     [0.008] 0.046***      [0.011] 0.051***  [0.014] 
Mother‘s Education 0.185***     [0.073] 0.143            [0.095] 0.134        [0.116] 
Mother‘s Age -0.004          [0.005] -0.022**       [0.012] -0.036**   [0.016] 
Mother Working -0.068          [0.115] -0.643**       [0.331] -0.778*     [0.448] 
Child Age 0.094***     [0.025] 0.091**         [0.032] 0.098***  [0.037] 
Household Wealth (if Poor) -0.060          [0.074] 0.127             [0.397] 0.036        [0.154] 
Non-Educated Father   -0.098       [0.122] 
Father‘s Age   0.009        [0.007] 
Residence (if Rural)   0.170        [0.139] 
Observations 1563 1563 1471 
R-Squared 0.04 … … 
F-Stat /Wald Chi2  9.29*** 42.13*** 39.63*** 
*** Significant at 1%       ** Significant at 5%           *Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Results of First Stage Logistic IV Regression 
 
 
 
 
Variable/Predictor of Woman‘s Power Co-efficient P-Value Std. Error 
Domestic Violence (No Controls) 0.085*** 0.000 0.019 
Domestic Violence (With Controls) 0.085** 0.002 0.027 
Woman‘s Years of Education 0.032 0.147 0.022 
Woman Working 0.235*** 0.000 0.038 
Woman‘s Age 0.007*** 0.000 0.001 
Child Gender (if Female) -0.05** 0.025 0.021 
Child BMI 0.84** 0.087 0.008 
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Table 3. Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics 
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Reduced Form Model (Dependent =Mother‘s Power) Structural Equation (Dependent= Child Health) 
Variables  Co-Efficient  [P-Value] Variables Co-Efficient  [P-Value] 
Domestic Violence1 .361 [0.004]** Mother‘s Power 1.553[0.009]** 
Woman‘s Years of Education 0.543[0.642] Woman‘s Years of Education 0.171[0.019]** 
Woman‘s BMI -0.013[258] Woman‘s BMI 0.039[0.000]*** 
Child Age 0.021[0.147] Child Age 0.086[0.001]*** 
Woman Working 1.241[0.000]*** Woman Working -0.438[0.023]** 
Woman‘s Age 0.037[0.000]*** Woman‘s Age -0.012[0.046]** 
Household Wealth -.309[0.009]** Household Wealth 0.027[0.740] 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%  and * at 10%  Reduced Form Residuals2 -0.584[0.017]** 
1 Domestic Violence is statistically significant 2Residuals are statistically significant 
HO = Residual= 0  i.e. Mother Power is exogenous Since The Residuals in the Structural Equation is 
statistically significant at 5% we  H1 = Residual ≠ 0, i.e. Mother Power is endogenous 
Variable Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child BMI Z-score 1759 -0.54 1.27 -3.94 5.89 
Child Gender Dummy (2 if female, 1 if male) 3299 1.48 0.50 1 2 
Child Age in Years 3128 4.39 5.08 0 5 
Woman‘s Age 4916 28.99 9.70 15 49 
Mother Power Dummy  2948 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Woman‘s BMI 4814   23.42 4.69 12.18 57.61 
Woman‘s Educated Dummy (1 if Yes , 0 if No) 4916 0.75 0.44 0 1 
Woman Working Dummy (=1 if yes, 0 if No) 4916 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Domestic Violence (Dummy) 4916 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Father‘s Education Dummy (1 if not educated, 0 if yes) 4916 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Father‘s Age in Years 2902 40.23 11.12 18 85 
Household Wealth Status (1 if poor, 0  if not-) 4916 0.409 0.49 0 1 
Residence Dummy (1 if Rural, 0 if Urban) 4916 1.56 0.50 0 1 
